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The international community has a declared intention to protect innocent civilians from direct 
and deliberate violence in civil conflicts, but its track record of actually doing so is mixed. Using 
a new monthly time-series data set, we explore the factors associated with variations in the 
number of civilians killed or wounded by participants in the civil war in Peru during the 1980s 
and 1990s. We find that an increase in the level of abuse by one side is strongly associated with 
subsequent increases in the level of abuse by the other. Certain types of foreign intervention had 
a large and statistically significant impact on the level of abuse; some types of intervention raised 
the level of violence, but others reduced it. 
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The adoption of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle by the United Nations (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2005; United Nations Security Council, 2006) has stimulated increased academic interest in 
issues surrounding violence against civilians in civil wars, and in the appropriate response to such 
violence by the international community (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Hultman, 2007; Kalyvas, 2006). It is 
common for both government and rebel forces to target civilians during civil wars and insurgencies. 
There are two reasons. Firstly, terror against civilians can sometimes reduce an opponent’s ability to 
mobilize support, increasing one’s chance of outright victory. Secondly, if there is no realistic chance of 
victory, one can use violence against civilians to create conditions in which an opponent prefers a 
negotiated settlement to continued fighting, and so improve one’s bargaining position (Lichbach, 1998). 
Weak governments may try to consolidate their position by attacking their own citizens, so care is needed 
to ensure that the international response to a conflict avoids aggravating civilian suffering (Azam and 
Hoeffler; 2002; Hultman, 2011). 
Despite a large amount of evidence on the factors that drive variations in the level of violence 
against civilians across different civil wars, or across regions in particular wars, little is known about the 
dynamics of violence – about what causes it to rise or fall over time. Our paper fills this gap using data 
published by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
1 In 2003, the TRC reported that 
almost 70,000 Peruvians lost their lives between 1980 and 2000 in the violent conflict between the 
Peruvian security forces and two guerrilla organisations, the Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA). Most of the casualties were unarmed civilians; some were caught 
in cross-fire, but many were specifically targeted by both government and rebel forces (Peru Support 
Group, 2004).  
Analysis of the data reveals a strong ‘cycle of violence’: typically, when one side increased 
attacks against its opponents or its effort in terrorizing civilians, the other side responded in kind. Foreign 
interventions designed to strengthen the government militarily exacerbated the conflict. In contrast, the 
cycle of violence was attenuated by interventions which raised the opportunity cost of fighting or reduced 
the resources available to fund the war effort. These results are relevant to the planning of international 
responses to conflicts in which weak governments are seriously challenged by rebel movements.  
The next part of the paper outlines the history of the Peruvian conflict. This is followed by a 
review the existing literature on civilian abuse and civil war, which informs our specific hypotheses about 
the factors driving variations in the level of abuse over time. We then present the data used to test these 
hypotheses, our modeling strategy and results. 
 
                                                            




SL originated as a Maoist student movement based in the rural highland region of Ayacucho. It first came 
to prominence in 1980 with attacks on civilians and government targets designed to disrupt the national 
elections. Over the next two years, SL increased its range of violent activity in Ayacucho and in the 
neighboring regions of Huancavelica and Apurímac, taking control of isolated villages and killing local 
officials and other ‘collaborators’. 
  Initially, government leaders appear not to have regarded SL as a serious threat. However, there 
was a gradual increase in the level of SL activity during 1981, and at the end of December emergency 
laws were introduced in the regions where SL was active. Government military forces were granted 
extensive arbitrary powers, and were soon reported to be participating in the torture, rape and murder of 
villagers who were difficult to distinguish from the rebels who lived among them. By the end of 1982, SL 
had formally engaged on Stage II of its revolutionary plan, the ‘protracted people’s war’, and both sides 
in the conflict had begun to kill large numbers of non-combatant civilians. 
  The civil war continued over the next decade, fought mainly in rural highland areas, but also 
occasionally in large cities. At the peak of the violence in the late 1980s, there were several hundred 
civilian conflict deaths every month. The main participants in the war were the regular government police 
and army units, the Ejército Guerrillero Popular and other pro-government paramilitary groups, and SL. 
Some attacks were also carried out by the MRTA and by government-armed village self-defense groups 
(the rondas campesinas), but these two participants together accounted for only 3-4% of total fatalities.  
Throughout most of this period, Peru was a parliamentary democracy, but many parts of the state 
forces operated independently of the elected government. In April 1992, the elected president, Alberto 
Fujimori, instigated a coup d'état against the legislature. The Peruvian congress was dissolved, the 
constitution was suspended and many senior judges were removed from office. One of the stated aims of 
the coup was to give government forces a freer hand in suppressing insurgency. Then in September 1992, 
police captured SL’s leader, Abimael Guzmán, who had been hiding in a house in Lima. After Guzmán’s 
capture, the leadership of SL became fragmented. Early in 1993, Fujimori introduced a ‘repentance law’, 
offering an amnesty to SL fighters who surrendered and co-operated with the government; over 5,000 
rebels made use of the amnesty over the next two years. Individual SL cells continued fighting, but by the 






CONFLICT INTENSITY, CIVILIAN ABUSE AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION: A SURVEY 
Determinants of the Level of Civilian Abuse 
 
One strand of the literature explores the abuse of civilians as a precursor to a conventional military 
offensive, in conflicts where the belligerent can reasonably expect to win the conflict outright. For 
example, Azam and Hoeffler (2002) present a model in which an incumbent government has an incentive 
to terrorize some of its civilians and force them to flee their homes. The population displacement disrupts 
either the rebels’ economic base or their recruitment base. (A recent example of such a strategy is the 
Pakistani government offensive against the Taliban in the Swat Valley.) In equilibrium, more abuse is 
likely when the government has more resources net of the cost of conventional fighting, and when the 
rebels are in a stronger position ex ante. Using cross-sectional data on the number of refugees from civil 
wars, Azam and Hoeffler provide evidence for several economic effects that are consistent with their 
game-theoretical model. For example, as predicted, higher levels of aid to a country – interpreted as a 
component of government resources – are associated with a larger number of refugees. In a similar study, 
Valentino et al. (2004) uses national level data on the incidence of mass killing to show that high civilian 
casualties are more likely when the rebels receive active support from the local people, or when the rebels 
represent a serious threat to the incumbent regime. 
A related literature
2 investigates the determinants of regional variation in the level of civilian 
abuse in particular civil wars. One common feature of many conflicts is that civilian casualties are more 
likely in regions where neither side has unequivocal support, and that political and ethnic minorities are 
safer when they are small minorities. Evidence for such a pattern appears in Balcells’ (2007) study of the 
Spanish Civil War, Bundervoet’s (2009) study of Burundi, de la Calle Robles’ (2007) study of the Basque 
Country, Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2006) study of Sierra Leone, and Kalyvas and Kocher’s (2009) 
study of Vietnam. Lyall (2009) presents evidence from Chechnya showing that campaigns of violence 
against civilians do sometimes create a military advantage. This evidence reinforces the idea that abuse of 
civilians is often a deliberate military strategy, focussed on areas where the contest for control is fiercest.  
Violence against civilians may also be used by a rebel group with little local support and no 
chance of defeating the government in battle. In this case, the violence is designed to raise the 
government’s cost of fighting the insurgency. By terrorizing the population, a rebel group can undermine 
popular support for the government and make ordinary civilian administration impossible. (An example 
of a group with such a strategy is the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.) The weaker party employs ‘the 
                                                            
2 These papers are part of a growing body of research on the microeconomics of civil wars; see Verwimp 
et al. (2009). 5 
 
bargaining power that comes from the capacity to hurt’ (Shelling, 1966), aiming to force a government to 
negotiate. In this context, Hultman (2007) shows that rebel groups use one-sided violence against 
civilians to compensate for military failure: there is a correlation between rebels’ battle losses and their 
subsequent killings of civilians.  
Other papers focus on rebel terror against civilians as a strategy to undermine support for the 
government. For example, Eck and Hultman (2007) show that a high level of abuse by rebels is more 
likely when the government is democratic, relying on popular support to govern and needing to 
demonstrate that it can protect its population.
3 Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) explore 
a model in which the rebels have an incentive to terrorize civilians if this provokes the government to do 
the same. The government response may reveal the value it places on the welfare of its citizens, and if this 
value is low then rebel support among the population may be strengthened. However, a separating 
equilibrium is not guaranteed, and there exist pooling equilibria in which rebel abuse leads governments 
of all types to choose the same level of abuse, which could be high or low.  
 
Foreign Economic Intervention and Civil Wars 
 
When the conflict has no genocidal motive and casualty numbers are relatively low, foreign intervention 
is likely to be economic, not military. The effect of economic intervention is complicated when both 
government and rebel forces are responsible for attacks on civilians. On the one hand, conflict intensity 
can increase in anticipation of an aid inflow that will shift the balance of power and make a settlement 
more likely, as each side tries to strengthen its position before the settlement is reached. On the other 
hand, aid can also increase the opportunity cost of war and therefore reduce the incentive of both sides to 
continue fighting (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). The higher opportunity cost could result from improved 
economic performance, better male education, or a change in relative prices, which reduces the real value 
of lootable export commodities.
4 Even without any demobilization, improved finances mean that soldiers 
can be paid, so they have less incentive to loot. 
Apart from Azam and Hoeffler (2002), no paper looks directly at the link between civilian 
suffering and foreign aid, but there are some studies of the impact of foreign economic intervention on the 
propensity of a country to engage in civil war.  Foreign aid could affect both the probability that a war 
will start and its duration once started. However, the evidence on foreign economic intervention is mixed. 
                                                            
3 For example, the legitimacy of the Karzai government in Afghanistan is under greater threat in those 
areas where it fails to provide civilians with security against Taliban attacks. 
4 That is, the resource inflow might have a ‘Dutch Disease’ effect; see Younger (1992). 6 
 
For example, Regan (2002) and Regan and Aydin (2006) find a positive association between intervention 
and the duration of civil wars. Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) find that foreign aid leads to higher 
levels of government military expenditure, and that this increases the probability that a civil war will 
start. On the other hand, Collier et al. (2004) find no statistically significant relationship between civil 
war duration and economic intervention. Using a dynamic panel data model, de Ree and Nillesen (2009) 
model civil war onset and civil war duration simultaneously. They find that foreign aid has no significant 
impact on the probability that a civil war will start, but increases the probability that it will end, once 
started. Arguably, their simultaneous treatment of onset and duration make these results the most robust. 
However, taken as a whole, the results from cross-section and panel data studies are inconclusive. One 
possible reason for this ambiguity is that the impact of aid on civil wars depends on country-specific 
economic characteristics. One key characteristic is the availability of lootable resources, in particular 
gems and narcotics. 
 
Narcotics and Conflict 
 
Lootable resources may create a rent-seeking motive for civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); even in 
the presence of other motives, such resources may provide rebels with a reliable source of funds. Coca 
and opium crops represent an extreme case, because rebels are likely to find them easier to exploit than 
does the incumbent government, which risks losing international legitimacy by trading narcotics. Cornell 
(2005) points out that 14% of the intrastate conflicts listed in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project occur in 
the 5% of countries which have substantial coca or opium exports. In these countries, it is very unusual to 
find rebel organisations not involved in the narcotics trade. Moreover, evidence suggests that the presence 
of narcotics increases civil war duration, everything else being equal (Ross, 2004a,b; Fearon, 2004). 
  The role of coca in funding the activity of SL is documented by Kay (1999), Palmer (1992) and 
Tarazona-Sevillano and Reuter (1990). In areas such as the Upper Huallaga Valley, SL operated as a 
middleman, running airstrips in remote locations and charging landing fees for planes transporting the 
coca crop to Colombia for processing. Estimates of coca production in rebel regions during the civil war 
are rather imprecise, but suggest that the extent of production was correlated with conflict intensity. For 
example, it is estimated that the area under coca cultivation in Peru fell from around 100,000 hectares in 
1992-1995 to around 40,000 hectares by the end of the decade. 
However, we know very little about the effect of variations over time in the availability of 
lootable resources, or in other economic incentives, on the rebel or government war effort. Similarly, we 
know little about how such variations might affect the propensity of either side to engage in civilian 
abuse. Before describing the data that we will use to address this gap in the literature, we present the main 7 
 
hypotheses that we wish to test. 
 
Hypotheses Concerning the Peruvian Conflict 
 
There is consistent evidence from around the world that civilian abuse is often a conscious military 
strategy, most frequently observed in locations where neither side in the conflict has an overwhelming 
military advantage. Taken together, theoretical papers exploring such strategies indicate that either an 
increase the extent of civilian abuse or some other sign of strength by the side that is initially weaker (the 
rebels) may be successful in provoking more abuse by the other side (the government). Such activity is 
likely to require a greater overall military effort by the government. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
 
H1. Increases in both the total level of conflict effort and in the extent of civilian abuse by the rebels (SL) 
will be associated with subsequent increases in the total level of conflict effort and in the extent of civilian 
abuse by the Peruvian government. 
 
Moreover, rebel attacks against civilians may rise when the rebels suffer losses in clashes with 
government troops (Hultman, 2007). Similarly, Taylor (1998) discusses anecdotal evidence from Peru 
that the killing of civilians suspected of rebel sympathies in a government-controlled village was often 
followed by the killing of civilians suspected of government sympathies the next time the village changed 
hands. We therefore explore the following hypothesis. 
H2. Increases in both the total level of conflict effort and in the extent of civilian abuse by the Peruvian 
government will be associated with subsequent increases in the total level of conflict effort and in the 
extent of civilian abuse by the rebels. 
 
Our other hypotheses concern economic factors that might affect conflict intensity, particularly economic 
interventions by the US and other foreign governments. The evidence on the relationship between foreign 
aid and conflict intensity is mixed. However, arguments that foreign aid will increase government military 
spending and so raise conflict intensity often refer to the fungibility of aid. Fungibility means that a 
militaristic government can respond to an increase in, for example, aid for health or education programs 
by reducing its own health and education expenditure, facilitating more military spending while keeping 
health and education provision constant. Evidence suggests that aid is not entirely fungible (Feyzioglu et 
al., 1998), and a positive association between general aid and government military spending does not 
necessarily entail a high level of fungibility, because the different components of aid to a given country in 
a given year (health aid, education aid, military aid) might be positively correlated. If we control for the 8 
 
level of military aid, then we might well be able to identify a clear negative link between general aid and 
conflict intensity, as such aid raises productivity and increases the opportunity cost of fighting. We 
consider the following two hypotheses. 
 
H3. Increases in military aid raise the total conflict effort and the extent of civilian abuse by the 
government. 
 
H4. Increases in general aid reduce the total conflict effort and the extent of civilian abuse by the 
government and rebels. 
 
Testing hypotheses about the link between coca revenue and conflict intensity is more difficult, because 
reliable high-frequency time-series data on coca production and coca prices is not available for Peru. 
However, one reliably documented statistic is the amount of US aid to Peru dedicated to disrupting the 
coca trade. If such aid is effective, it will increase the rebels’ opportunity costs. Moreover, by investing 
Peruvian police with human capital specific to counter-narcotics activity, it may influence the deployment 
of government forces at the margin.
5 Counter-narcotics operations do not typically involve the forced 
relocation of large numbers of people, so this may reduce the extent of government abuse of civilians. 
Our fifth hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H5. Increases in counter-narcotics aid reduce the total conflict effort and the extent of civilian abuse by 
the government and rebels. 
 
The final hypothesis concerns the effect of changes in the government’s economic strength on conflict 
intensity. During the civil war period Peru faced an economic crisis. Between 1988 and 1991 (when a 
new currency was introduced), the country experienced annual consumer price inflation rates of well over 
100%. During this hyperinflationary period, public sector wage increases often lagged behind price 
increases, and the real value of wages paid in Peruvian currency was very uncertain. This may have 
worsened recruitment and desertion problems for government forces. (On the other hand, the rebels, 
relying from coca revenue in US Dollars, are unlikely to have been directly affected by inflation in local 
currency prices.) Our final hypothesis is as follows. 
                                                            
5 The figures presented at www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/americas/14peru.html suggest that 
counter-narcotics aid was effective in reducing coca production in Peru in the mid 1990s, despite worries 
that police trained for counter-narcotics operations were used for more general military purposes (General 
Accounting Office Report to Congress GAO/NSIAD-92-36; B-245527). 9 
 
 
H6. Increases in inflation reduce the total conflict effort and the extent of civilian abuse by the 
government. 
 
DATA ON THE PERUVIAN CONFLICT 
Data on Civilian Abuse and Conflict Intensity 
 
Our primary source of data is the TRC. Between 2001 and 2003, the TRC interviewed just under 17,000 
witnesses to violent events in Peru during 1980-2000; the TRC’s final report appears in Corazao et al. 
(2003). TRC transcripts provide information about individual conflict events, including the time and 
location of the event, which military group initiated it (for example, a regular government police or army 
unit, a government-funded paramilitary group, or SL), how many members of each group were killed or 
injured, and how many civilians were killed or injured. These data have been collated by the Conflict 
Analysis Resource Center (www.cerac.org.co), and published as the Peru Conflict Database V1. Ball et 
al. (2003) provide an overview of the TRC data, and compare them with data from alternative sources. 
Ball et al. conclude that the TRC documented the broadest range of perpetrators of violence, and that it is 
the most comprehensive and consistent source of information about the conflict. Other organisations, 
which collected data contemporaneously, were not able to conduct surveys when the conflict was most 
intense. Moreover, they were concerned principally with human rights violations by government forces, 
and appear to have substantially under-reported violence by rebel groups. 
  Some of the cross-sectional variation in the database has already been analyzed (Castillo and 
Petrie, 2007; León, 2009). However, we are interested in the time-series variation. By aggregating 
individual observations in the database, we are able to construct monthly observations for the following 
quantities:
6 the number of conflict events initiated by regular government forces or paramilitaries 
(government / paramilitary attacks),
7 the number initiated by rebel forces (rebel attacks),
8 the number of 
civilians killed or injured in government / paramilitary attacks, the number killed or injured in rebel 
attacks, and the number of civilians detained by government forces in any type of event. In most cases, it 
                                                            
6 The TRC’s focus was on the civilian victims of conflict, and is therefore not a reliable source of data on 
rebel deaths (Fielding et al., 2010). 
7 Paramilitaries account for about 9% of government-funded attacks and about 12% of civilians killed by 
government-funded forces. 
8 Since SL attacks make up over 98% of all rebel attacks, it makes little difference to the time series 
whether other rebel groups are included. In the figures discussed below, they are included. 10 
 
is unclear from the database what eventually happened to those who were detained, but we interpret total 
detentions as an approximate estimate of the number of ‘disappearances’.  
  Totals for each of the series are listed in Table 1a. One complication is that some of the conflict 
events are not dated precisely enough to allocate them to a particular month: we know only the year in 
which they happened. Such events account for 20% of all government / paramilitary attacks and 5% of all 
rebel attacks. In the results reported below, these annual observations are included in the following way. 
Let xt be the total number of observations of a particular dimension of the conflict (for example, rebel 
attacks) in month t. Let xy be the total number of annual observations for that year (t  y), and let             
xs =  t  y xt. In other words, xs is the sum of all monthly observations over the year. Our preferred 
measure of conflict intensity for month t is xt' = [1 + xy / xs] · xt. That is, we scale our original monthly 
observations by the ratio of total observations for the year to total monthly observations. In other words, 
we allocate the observations that cannot be dated precisely in proportion to the relative level of conflict 
intensity apparent in the monthly data. In the attached materials, we explore the consequences of 
modeling the conflict using xt instead of xt'; this turns out to make very little difference to our results. 
The five xt' time series are depicted in Figure 1 for the period January 1980 – December 2000. 
We regard the number of civilian casualties caused by either side as an index of the intensity of their 
abuse of civilians, and the number of attacks as an index of their overall conflict effort. The number of 
civilian detentions measures a separate and distinct dimension of the government’s abuse of civilians. It 
can be seen that there is some positive correlation between the different series: for example, they all peak 
in the middle of 1984. However, the correlation is far from perfect, and the different series represent 
separate and distinct dimensions of conflict intensity. 
 
Data on the Correlates of Conflict Intensity 
 
Hypotheses H3-H5 relate to the effect on conflict intensity of different types of aid: general development 
aid, military aid, and counter-narcotics aid. General development aid is measured as the total amount of 
overseas development assistance from OECD countries to Peru in deflated millions of US Dollars, as 
reported in the OECD Development Assistance Committee database (www.oecd.org/dac). Figures for 
military aid and counter-narcotics aid, also measured in deflated millions of US Dollars, are taken from 
the US Overseas Loans and Grants database (the Greenbook, www.usaid.gov/policy/greenbook.html). 
These data exclude military aid from other OECD countries, but such aid is likely to represent a very 
small fraction of the total. The different aid series are shown in Figure 2. These data are reported only on 
an annual basis; in our monthly dataset, the observation for month t will be the level of aid in the whole 
year including month t. 11 
 
  Hypothesis H6 relates to the effect on conflict intensity of consumer price inflation. A monthly 
Peruvian consumer price index is reported in the International Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics database (www.imfstatistics.org). Our measure of inflation in month t is the rate of growth of 
this index in the 12 months up to t; this series is also shown in Figure 2.
9 
 
MODELING THE CONFLICT 
Data Transformations 
 
All five of the conflict series in Figure 1 have distributions that are highly skewed, with a few very large 
observations in the right-hand tail of the distribution. When we try to fit a linear model to the data in 
Figure 1, we end up with regression residual distributions that are highly skewed and fat-tailed. Small 
changes in sample size lead to large changes in estimated parameter values, suggesting that a linear model 
is not robust. For this reason, we work with logarithmic transformations of the series, which are depicted 
in Figure 3. The series are defined a follows. 
 
Gov~attackst   the logarithm of government / paramilitary attacks in month t  
Gov~killedt   the logarithm of the number of civilians killed or injured in government / paramilitary 
attacks in month t  
Detentionst   the logarithm of the number of civilians detained in month t  
Rebel~attackst   the logarithm of rebel attacks in month t  
Rebel~killedt   the logarithm of the number of civilians killed or injured in rebel attacks in month t  
 
With the exception of a single outlier (rebel attacks in April 1986), the distribution of these transformed 
variables is approximately normal, and Tables 1b-1c show their means, standard deviations and 
correlations. In the attached materials, we show that all of the variables are stationary. We will see that 
using the transformed data produces robust regression results. The implication of the logarithmic 
transformation in our model is that a given percentage change in one dimension of the conflict is 
associated with a certain percentage change in the others. 
  Similarly, we take logarithms of the aid variables discussed in the previous section. In the 
                                                            
9 It is also possible to construct a month-on-month inflation series, but this series is highly volatile, and 
does not capture the hyperinflationary period around 1990 as starkly as the annual inflation series in 
Figure 2. We will see that annual inflation is a statistically significant determinant of conflict intensity; 
month-on-month inflation is not. 12 
 
attached materials, we show that these variables are also stationary, except for narcotics aid. Nevertheless, 
the growth rate of narcotics aid is stationary. The four other variables used in our model are therefore as 
follows:  
 
Military~aidt  the logarithm of the deflated value of US military aid in the year including month t 
OECD~aidt   the logarithm of the deflated value of total OECD overseas development assistance in the 
year including month t 
Narco~aidt    the growth rate of the deflated value of US counter-narcotics aid between the year 
including month t and the previous year 
Inflationt  consumer price inflation over the 12 months up to month t 
 
Our model includes one further variable. We need to allow for the possibility that the major events of 
1992 – the presidential coup in April and the capture of Guzmán in September – had an impact on the 
strategies of government and rebel forces. One way to capture the impact of specific events is to include a 
dummy variable equal to zero before the event and one afterwards. However, it does not make sense to 
include more than one such variable to capture the events of 1992, because the variables will be very 
highly correlated with each other. In the results reported below, we include a single dummy variable 
(Coupt), switching from zero to one in the middle of 1992. Fortunately, changing the switching point to 
April or September makes no substantial difference to our results. The significance of a coefficient on 
such a dummy variable indicates that one or other of the events of 1992 had an impact on strategy, but the 
events are too close in time for there to be any power in a statistical test of which one is important. 
 
Model Structure And Modeling Techniques 
 
Our model of conflict intensity is designed to shed light on the hypotheses listed in section 2.4. Now we 
restate these hypotheses in relation to the data we have presented. 
 
H1
R. Rises in Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed will be associated with subsequent rises in Gov~attacks, 





















R. Rises in Inflation will reduce Gov~attacks, Gov~killed, and Detentions. 
 
We explore these hypotheses by fitting a time-series model designed to capture the dynamics of the 
interactions of the different conflict intensity variables. There are several existing papers which use 
similar kinds of data, including studies of Algeria (Hagelstein, 2007), Colombia (Brauer et al., 2004; 
Restrepo and Spagat, 2010), Egypt (Fielding and Shortland, 2010) and Israel (Jaeger and Paserman, 
2008). These papers exhibit a wide range of modeling techniques; a common obstacle in all of them is the 
lack of plausible identifying restrictions needed to establish the size of the instantaneous impact of one 
dimension of conflict (for example, the number of government attacks) on another (for example, the 
number of rebel attacks). One side in the conflict might respond within hours to activity by the other side. 
Therefore, if activity on both sides changes from one month to the next, we cannot tell how much of the 
change results from a government initiative and how much from a rebel initiative. Jaeger and Paserman 
(2008) address this problem by using very high frequency data. They use daily measures of conflict 
intensity, so the assumption that one side reacts to activity by the other side with a one-period lag is more 
plausible, and there is no need to identify instantaneous reactions. In conflicts subject to less intense 
media scrutiny than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, finding reliable daily data is very difficult. As we have 
seen, some of the conflict data in Peru cannot be allocated with any certainty to a particular month, let 
alone a particular day. For this reason, we do not attempt to identify the magnitude of contemporaneous 
causal effects in the conflict variables. Instead, we explore the hypotheses listed above by using a form of 
impulse response analysis. This type of analysis, based on a reduced-form vector-autoregressive model 
(VAR), is discussed below. First, we describe the structure of the VAR that we use to model our conflict 
data. 
Our VAR comprises the five conflict intensity variables, the four economic correlates of conflict 
intensity and the dummy variable for the events of 1992. Let Xt = [Gov~attackst, Gov~killedt, Detentionst, 
Rebel~attackst,  Rebel~killedt] and Zt = [Military~aidt,  OECD~aidt,  Narco~aidt,  Inflationt]. These 
interactions between these variables are modeled as follows: 
 14 
 
Gov~attackst  =    1t + Xt-1 11 + Xt-2 12 + Xt-3 13 + Xt-4 14 + Zt 11 + Zt-12 12 +  1.Coupt + u1t          (1) 
Gov~killedt  =  2t + Xt-1 21 + Xt-2 22 + Xt-3 23 + Xt-4 24 + Zt 21 + Zt-22 12 +  2.Coupt + u2t             (2) 
Detentionst  =  3t + Xt-1 31 + Xt-2 32 + Xt-3 33 + Xt-4 34 + Zt 31 + Zt-12 32 +  3.Coupt + u3t              (3) 
Rebel~attackst  =  4t + Xt-1 41 + Xt-2 42 + Xt-3 43 + Xt-4 44 + Zt 41 + Zt-12 42 +  4.Coupt + u4t          (4) 
Rebel~killedt  =   5t + Xt-1 51 + Xt-2 52 + Xt-3 53 + Xt-4 54 + Zt 51 + Zt-12 52 +  5.Coupt + u5t          (5) 
 
Each  ij term represents a (5  1) vector of parameters, and each  ij term a (4  1) vector of parameters. 
The uit terms are regression residuals, and the  it terms are intercepts specific to each month of the year. 
(We also allow for a different intercept in the Rebel~attacks equation in April 1986, the month when there 
is an extreme outlier. However, excluding the April 1986 dummy makes no substantial difference to our 
results.) Our model allows the current level of each conflict intensity variable to depend on levels of each 
of the other conflict intensity variables up to four months ago, and on the levels of the economic 
correlates of conflict intensity in the current and previous year.
10 The model can be viewed as a reduced-
form representation of a system of structural equations in which each of the conflict variables has a 
contemporaneous effect on the others. The regression residuals ui are linear combinations of the shocks to 
the structural equations, and therefore likely to be correlated with each other.  
  This model is not fitted to the whole twenty years of data depicted in Figure 1. Despite a number 
of casualties in isolated conflict events in 1980 and 1981, Stage II of SL’s plan, the ‘protracted people’s 
war’, began only in the later part of 1982 (Tapia, 1997). Similarly, the Peruvian government appears to 
have been genuine in its assessment of the organisation up until the end of 1982 as ‘cattle rustlers’ and 
‘bandits’ (Fumerton, 2000). Recognition by both sides that they had engaged in a civil war appears to date 
from the end of 1982. We therefore model the conflict with data starting in January 1983. Dating the end 
of the conflict is less straightforward. Guzmán’s capture in 1992 caused serious disruption to the 
operations of a very hierarchical rebel organisation, but the fighting continued. The introduction of the 
repentance law in early 1993 caused further disruption: over 5,000 rebels made use of this law up until its 
revocation at the end of 1994 (Palmer, 2007). This appears to have had a more substantial direct impact 
on rebel activity than Guzmán’s capture, and Figure 1 shows a sharp drop in rebel attacks at the end of 
1993. In the attached materials, we explore the consequences for our results of changing the date at which 
our sample period ends. If we extend the sample period beyond the end of 1993, the parameters in the 
Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed equations become unstable. The results reported below are therefore 
                                                            
10 Coefficients on lags of a higher order than this are not statistically significant. 15 
 
based on fitting our model to data for January 1983 – December 1993.
11 
Including the seasonal intercepts, each regression equation in our model contains 41 parameters; 
these parameters are estimated on a sample of 132 observations. Many individual parameters are 
statistically insignificant, and the full unrestricted model represented by equations (1-5) is unlikely to be 
an accurate representation of the data generating process. For this reason, we fit both the unrestricted 
model and a restricted model in which the number of parameters is reduced using the algorithm discussed 
by Krolzig and Hendry (2001). This algorithm is designed to identify the most likely representation of the 
data generating process, assuming that the parameters of this process are some subset of the parameters of 
the unrestricted model. Most of the results presented below are based on the restricted model. 
  The parameters of our model can be estimated in a number of different ways. First, if we impose 
restrictions on equations (1-5), and if the residuals uit are correlated with each other, then the Least 
Squares estimator (LS) is no longer efficient; alternatives include the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
estimator (SUR) and the Maximum Likelihood estimator (ML). Secondly, Military~aidt and Narco~aidt 
might not be independent of the conflict variables X t: the size of the US military or counter-narcotics 
intervention in a particular year might depend on conflict intensity. One way of dealing with this problem 
is to use Greenbook data on US military or counter-narcotics aid to the whole of the rest of the world (or 
to the whole of Latin America) as an instrument for aid to Peru. Variations in global aid figures are 
unlikely to depend on the Peruvian conflict, and are likely to be correlated with the conflict only through 
the corresponding variations in aid to Peru.
12 The sample correlation coefficient for Military~aidt and the 
log of military aid to the rest of the world is 0.63; the equivalent correlation coefficient for Narco~aidt for 
is 0.58. If we use aid to Latin America instead of aid to the rest of the world, the correlation coefficients 
are 0.63 and 0.53 respectively. In other words, most of the variation in US aid to Peru is due to global 
changes in the US aid budget. Global figures are therefore likely to be a strong instrument for the 
Peruvian figures.
13 
  With three choices of estimator (LS, SUR, ML) and three ways of dealing with the potential 
                                                            
11 Equations (1-5) include lagged values of the conflict variables, so, the first observation in the data that 
we actually use is for September 1982. 
12 In the sample period, military aid to Peru constitutes 1% of worldwide military aid and 9% of Latin 
American military aid. 
13 Because we have only annual aid data, it is not feasible to include all of the regressors in equations    
(1-5) in the instrument set for aid: there is a high probability that such an approach would lead to spurious 
over-fitting of the aid equation. We use only the global aid variable as an instrument for aid to Peru, so 
our approach is different from the traditional Instrumental Variables estimator. 16 
 
endogeneity of Military~aidt and Narco~aidt (ignoring it, using worldwide aid as an instrument, using 
Latin American aid as an instrument), we have nine different ways to fit our model. In the main text, we 
restrict our attention to the three alternatives using SUR. The other results are reported the attached 
materials; using one of the other estimators instead makes little difference to the results.  
  The parameters of the fitted model need to be interpreted with caution, because equations (1-5) 
represent a reduced-form system. Rather than trying to find some identifying restrictions with which to 
infer the parameters of the underlying structural model from the reduced-form parameters, we interpret 
our results by constructing impulse response profiles. Two types of impulse response profile are 
constructed. First, in order to interpret the  ij parameters and address hypotheses H1-H2, we construct 
‘generalised impulse response’ profiles (GIRs) for historically typical shocks, using the method of Evans 
and Wells (1983). The following paragraph provides a brief overview of the method. 
Consider a system of i = 1,…, 5 variables such as equations (1-5). There will probably be some 
correlation between the shocks ui, so it does not make sense to plot out the response of the system to a 
single shock. Such an event – a change in u1, for example, leaving the other ui’s unchanged – will never 
actually be observed. A GIR represents the response of the system to a more ‘realistic’ type of shock. On 












. We can therefore think of a typical shock to the system that 
raises  u1  by an amount v as a vector of individual shocks [u1,  u2,…,  u5]  with  magnitudes  equal  to             
[v, (21 /11) · v,…, (51 /11) · v]. Using the estimated  ij parameters, we can trace out the effect of this 
shock on each variable in the system over subsequent months. This shows us what happens on average 
after a v-shock to Gov~attacks, which also involves unanticipated contemporaneous shocks to the rest of 
the system. The same method can be used to characterize the response of the system to a typical v-shock 
in any of the ui using magnitudes equal to [(1i /ii) · v,…, v,…, (5i / ii) · v]. 
We use a different type of response profile to interpret the estimated  ij parameters and address 
hypotheses H3-H6, because these parameters capture the impact on the system of exogenous changes in 
the different aid variables, and in inflation. For example, let the vector   ij = [
1234
ij ij ij ij  ]'.
14 If the 
variable Military~aid  increases by an amount w, then the immediate effect on Gov~attacks is a change of 
magnitude 
1
11 w   , the immediate effect on Gov~killed is a change of magnitude 
1
21 w   , and so on. In the 
next month, these changes in conflict intensity will be magnified through the interactions between the 
                                                            
14 In the restricted version of the model, some of the individual 
k
ij   parameters may be equal to zero. 17 
 
different conflict variables captured by the i1 parameters. The response of the system in subsequent 
months can then be traced out using the other  ij parameters, and, if the hypothetical increase in 
Military~aid  persists into the next year, using the  i2 parameters. The same can be done for hypothetical 





Table 2 reports the parameters of the restricted model estimated by SUR, along with corresponding t-
ratios. (LS and ML estimates are presented in the attached materials, as are the parameters of the 
unrestricted model.) Column 1 in the table corresponds to the estimates in which no instruments are used 
for Military~aid or Narco~aid; column 2 corresponds to the estimates using worldwide aid figures as 
instruments, and column 3 to the estimates using Latin American aid figures as instruments. Generally, 
the use of instruments makes little difference to the results, except that the coefficients on Narco~aidt (but 
not  Narco~aidt-12) in the Gov~killed equation and on Coupt in the Rebel~killed equation become 
statistically insignificant. Table 3 presents descriptive and diagnostic statistics for both the unrestricted 
model and the Table 2 (Column 1) model. None of the diagnostic statistics gives any cause for concern. 
Table 4 reports the residual correlation coefficients. All of these coefficients are positive, and 
some are significantly greater than zero. This suggests that the parameters in Table 2 should be 
interpreted as reduced-form parameters, and we interpret them using impulse response profiles. These 
profiles are shown in Figures 4-12, and represent the response of the system over the 24 months following 
a typical shock to one of the conflict variables (the shock lasting for a single month), or following an 
increase in one of the aid variables, or in inflation (the increase lasting for two years). The black lines 
indicate the estimated responses in months 1-24 following the shock in month zero, and the gray lines 
indicate points two standard errors above and below these estimates. In addition to the response profiles 
for increases in aid and inflation in Figures 9-12, Table 5 reports estimates of the impact of such increases 
in the steady state, were they to be permanent. The hypothetical shocks are of magnitude v = 1, and the 
hypothetical increases in aid or inflation are of magnitude w = 1; we will interpret the figures by referring 
to the effect of a 1% shock to a conflict variable, or of a 1% increase in aid or inflation. Figures 4-12 are 
based on the coefficients in Table 3 (column 1); figures based on one of the other sets of coefficients in 
Table 3 or in the attached materials are very similar. We plot the responses of all of the conflict variables 
to all of the shocks, but our discussion focuses on the subset of responses relevant to our hypotheses. 
  Figures 7-8, plotting responses to typical shocks to Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed, are relevant 
                                                            
15 The results in this section were produced using TSP 5.0, GiveWin 2.0 and PCGets 1.0. 18 
 
to hypothesis H1. It can be seen that Gov~attacks, Gov~killed and Detentions all rise following such 
shocks. The responses of Gov~attacks and Gov~killed following a shock to Rebel~attacks (Figure 7), and 
of Gov~killed following a shock to Rebel~killed (Figure 8), are all more than two standard errors above 
zero in months 4-5, indicating that these are statistically significant effects. In these months, the estimated 
size of the response of Gov~attacks to the Rebel~attacks shock and of Gov~killed to the Rebel~killed 
shock is about 0.25: a typical shock raising Rebel~attacks (or Rebel~killed) by 1% leads to a subsequent 
increase in Gov~attacks (or Gov~killed) of about 0.25%. The magnitude of the response of Gov~killed to 
a typical shock to Rebel~attacks is about three times as large. This is evidence for hypothesis H1: 
unanticipated increases in the overall rebel conflict effort, and in the extent of rebel abuse of civilians, are 
followed by corresponding (although less than proportionate) increases in the government conflict effort 
and in government abuse, as measured by Gov~attacks and Gov~killed. The response of Detentions to 
typical shocks to Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed is positive but not significantly greater than zero, so we 
do not have any strong evidence that the number of disappearances increases following an unanticipated 
surge in rebel activity. 
  Figures 4-6, plotting responses to typical shocks to Gov~attacks, Gov~killed and Detentions, are 
relevant to hypothesis H2. A typical shock to any of these variables is associated with a subsequent 
increase in Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed. In all cases, the increase is significantly greater than zero at 
some point during the first four months following the shock. A typical shock raising Gov~attacks by 1% 
leads to a subsequent increase in Rebel~attacks by about 0.2% and in Rebel~killed by about 0.3% within 
the next three to four months (Figure 4). For a typical shock to Gov~killed (Figure 6) or Detentions 
(Figure 8), the responses of Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed are much smaller, with the impulse response 
profiles peaking below 0.1. That is, rebel activity responds more to a shock raising the level of overall 
government military effort than it does to a shock raising the level of government abuse of civilians. 
Nevertheless, all of the effects are statistically significant. These results support hypothesis H2. Increases 
in government conflict effort and the extent of government abuse of civilians are followed by an increase 
in rebel activity, particularly their abuse of civilians. There is a cycle of violence in which increased 
civilian abuse by either side is followed by increased civilian abuse by the other; the same is true of the 
two sides’ overall level of military effort. 
  Figure 9, plotting the responses of the conflict intensity variables to an increase in the level of US 
military aid to the Peruvian government, is relevant to hypothesis H3. Note that this figure plots the 
response of the conflict to a sustained increase in the level of aid, not to a temporary shock, so the 
response profiles do not converge back to zero. All of the responses are positive, indicating that an 
increase in military aid will raise all dimensions of conflict intensity. For Gov~killed  (but not for 
Gov~attacks or Detentions), the responses are significantly greater than zero, providing some evidence 19 
 
for hypothesis H3: more military aid raises the level of government abuse of civilians. Note also that there 
are significant positive responses in Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed. In Table 5, we see that the eventual 
effect of a sustained increase in the level of military aid by 1% would be to raise Gov~killed by 0.07%, 
Rebel~attacks by 0.11% and Rebel~killed by 0.05%. It is striking that the effect on Rebel~attacks is 
greater than the effect on Gov~attacks (which is not significantly greater than zero). These effects are 
estimated in a reduced-form model, so we cannot be sure of the reason for this, but it might be because 
military aid changes the way in which government forces fight (for example, they might fight more 
effectively or more murderously), and this induces a response in rebel mobilization. 
Figure 10, plotting the responses of the conflict intensity variables to an increase in the level of 
overseas development assistance, is relevant to hypothesis H4. All of the responses are negative, 
indicating that an increase in overseas development assistance will lower all dimensions of conflict 
intensity. Again, it is the responses of Gov~killed, Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed that are statistically 
significant. In Table 6, we see that the eventual effect of a sustained increase in the level of overseas 
development assistance by 1% would be to lower Gov~killed by 0.89%, Rebel~attacks by 1.36% and 
Rebel~killed by 0.61%. These effects provide strong evidence for hypothesis H4: when we control for 
military aid levels, we see that general aid has a large beneficial effect on the Peruvian conflict. 
A similar pattern emerges in Figure 11, which addresses hypothesis H5 by plotting the responses 
of the conflict intensity variables to an increase in the rate of growth of counter-narcotics aid. All five 
response profiles in the figure are significantly below zero. The largest effects are in the variables 
measuring government abuse of civilians, Gov~killed and Detentions. In Table 6, we see that the eventual 
effect of a sustained increase in the rate of growth of counter-narcotics aid by 1% would be to lower 
Gov~attacks by 1.37%, Gov~killed by 1.94%, Detentions  by 1.81%, Rebel~attacks by 0.36% and 
Rebel~killed by 0.62%. These are the largest beneficial effects in the model, and they constitute strong 
evidence for hypothesis H5. However, they should be interpreted with caution, because it is unrealistic to 
suppose that a higher rate of growth of counter-narcotics aid could be sustained forever. The model 
suggests that counter-narcotics aid does have a large impact on conflict intensity, but, given the time-
series properties of the data, the impact is likely to be short-lived. 
Figure 12 addresses our final hypothesis by plotting the responses of the conflict intensity 
variables to an increase in the rate of inflation. In this case, the evidence is mixed. The response of 
Gov~attacks is statistically insignificant. For Gov~killed there is a significant negative response, and for 
Detentions there is a significant positive response. A 1% increase in inflation reduces Gov~killed by about 
0.2% and increases Detentions by about 0.1%. Given the tripe-digit levels of inflation observed within the 
sample period, these are large effects. With a sustained reduction in the inflation rate the Gov~killed 
response persists, but the Detentions response declines slowly, and is insignificantly different from zero 20 
 
in the steady state. One interpretation of these effects is that an increase in inflation did make it more 
difficult to run the military operations required to terrorize the civilian population. However, some of this 





Ball et al. (2003) estimate that Peruvian government and rebel forces killed 69,280 civilians during the 
civil war. Previous studies of civil wars in Peru and elsewhere have used cross-sectional data to analyze 
those characteristics of civilians and soldiers (and of the areas where they live) that are associated with a 
high risk of civilian abuse. In this paper we have analyzed a different dimension of the data, looking at the 
factors that led to changes in the level of abuse in Peru while the war was ongoing. 
  Our first main finding is that when one side in the war increased its level of civilian abuse or 
overall military effort, the other side responded in kind. There was a cycle of violence in which each side 
responded in the same way to activity by the other side. This makes the war in Peru different from some 
other conflicts in which there are marked asymmetries in strategy, for example, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (Jaeger and Paserman, 2008). In wars like the one in Peru, encouraging or facilitating an increase 
in the government forces’ level of military effort in the field will only exacerbate the level of conflict and 
entail higher civilian casualties. The war in Peru was brought to an end not by the defeat of rebel forces in 
the field, but by the arrest of the rebel leader outside the theater of battle, and the subsequent amnesty 
offered to his lieutenants. 
  This leads to our second main finding: military aid to the Peruvian government led directly to an 
increase in the level of conflict intensity and the amount of civilian suffering. Such aid raised the fighting 
capacity of one side in the cycle of violence, but this was not sufficient to persuade the Peruvian 
government to abandon the patterns of behavior of a weak belligerent. Instead, the government used the 
additional resources to terrorize its rural population more effectively. By contrast, both general overseas 
development assistance and specific counter-narcotics aid led directly to a decrease the level of conflict 
intensity and the amount of civilian suffering. Development aid increased the opportunity cost of fighting, 
and counter-narcotics aid helped to weaken the rebel movement by reducing its income. The Peruvian 
data provide evidence that participants in a civil war do respond to economic incentives. Through 
economic interventions, the international community has the capacity both to mitigate civil conflict and to 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Conflict Intensity Variables 




































































































































































total of monthly observations  3328  5089  5795  3704  7243 
total of annual observations    849    820    735    193  1133 
annual observations as a fraction of all observations   0.20   0.14   0.11   0.05   0.14 
 
 
(b) Means and Standard Deviations of Transformed Conflict Intensity Variables 
(January 1983 – December 1993) 
 
 
Gov~attacks Gov~killed Detentions Rebel~attacks  Rebel~killed
mean 3.150  3.276 3.342 3.170  3.794
std. dev.  0.565  0.948 0.983 0.440  0.738
 
 
 (c) Correlations among Transformed Conflict Intensity Variables 
(January 1983 – December 1993) 
 
  Gov~attacks Gov~killed Detentions  Rebel~attacks
Gov~killed  0.551  
Detentions  0.754 0.319  
Rebel~attacks  0.509 0.370 0.423 
Rebel~killed  0.414 0.288 0.395 0.76026 
 
 
Table 2. SUR Regression Coefficients 
(1) no instruments for  (2) world instruments for  (3) LA instruments for 
  Military / Narco~aid  Military / Narco~aid  Military / Narco~aid 
Gov~attacks equation  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio 
Gov~attackst-1   0.399   6.48   0.411   6.62   0.399   6.46 
Gov~attackst-3   0.335   3.68   0.354   3.87   0.337   3.71 
Detentionst-3  -0.129  -2.79  -0.142  -3.03  -0.135  -2.95 
Rebel~killedt-1   0.124   2.80   0.118   2.66   0.129   2.96 
Rebel~killedt-3   0.112   2.40   0.116   2.49   0.124   2.68 
Narco~aidt  -0.202  -2.41  -0.295  -2.30  -0.371  -2.61 
Narco~aidt-12  -0.246  -3.13  -0.163  -2.28  -0.176  -2.48 
 0.33 0.30 0.26 
Gov~killed equation  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio 
Gov~attackst-1   0.462   2.63   0.519   2.92   0.522   2.92 
Gov~attackst-3   0.711   3.04   0.725   3.04   0.723   3.02 
Gov~killedt-4  -0.249  -3.04  -0.245  -2.95  -0.249  -2.97 
Detentionst-3  -0.373  -3.59  -0.363  -3.39  -0.352  -3.31 
Rebel~attackst-4   0.555   2.72   0.504   2.44   0.489   2.33 
Rebel~killedt-2   0.224   2.13   0.232   2.17   0.243   2.26 
Narco~aidt  -0.477  -2.48  -0.296  -1.02  -0.166  -0.45 
Narco~aidt-12  -0.685  -3.63  -0.468  -2.76  -0.467  -2.69 
Inflationt  -0.183  -3.25  -0.193  -3.35  -0.188  -3.12 
Coupt  -0.953  -4.59  -0.919  -4.28  -0.903  -3.74 
  0.72 0.35 0.73 
Detentions equation  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio 
Gov~attackst-3   0.734   3.76   0.762   3.99   0.706   3.37 
Detentionst-3  -0.298  -2.70  -0.337  -3.09  -0.299  -2.87 
Rebel~killedt-1   0.245   2.34   0.232   2.26   0.265   2.01 
Rebel~killedt-3   0.287   2.61   0.311   2.88   0.320   2.52 
Narco~aidt  -0.482  -2.48  -1.040  -3.40  -0.925  -2.89 
Narco~aidt-12  -0.538  -2.98  -0.334  -2.08  -0.381  -2.37 
Inflationt   0.107    2.43   0.099   2.29   0.093   3.02 
  0.76 0.48 0.76 
Rebel~attacks equation  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio 
Gov~attackst-4   0.152   3.00   0.129   2.41   0.135   2.56 
Rebel~attackst-1   0.194   2.90   0.279   4.14   0.255   3.80 
Rebel~attackst-3   0.233   3.58   0.263   3.83   0.238   3.47 
Military~aidt   0.059   3.90   0.027   1.51   0.045   2.31 
OECD~aidt  -0.726  -4.60  -0.439  -3.00  -0.449  -3.12 
April 1986  -1.052  -4.02  -0.992  -3.56  -1.046  -3.80 
  0.30 0.11 0.37 
Rebel~killed equation  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio 
Gov~attackst-2   0.163   1.12   0.162   1.10   0.156   0.88 
Gov~attackst-3   0.353   2.02   0.368   2.08   0.368   2.96 
Detentionst-3  -0.117  -1.48  -0.128  -1.61  -0.130  -1.79 
Rebel~attackst-2   0.364   2.37   0.355   2.29   0.362   2.37 
Coupt  -0.411  -2.51  -0.256  -1.60  -0.290  -1.23 
  0.67 0.70 0.68 
    
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Table 3. Regression Diagnostic and Descriptive Statistics 













unrestricted model diagnostic statistic p-values 
Chow F-Test
§   0.65   0.94   0.93   0.17   0.50 
Jarque-Bera 
2-test   0.63   0.70   0.77   0.38   0.59 
LM autocorrelation F-test   0.76   0.13   0.74   0.86   0.51 
Heteroscedasticity F-test  1.00   0.97   0.86   0.99   0.99 
unrestricted model descriptive statistics 
R
2   0.78   0.59   0.56   0.70   0.41 
Akaike  Criterion  -2.06 -0.39 -0.26 -2.25 -0.54 
 
restricted model diagnostic statistic p-values 
Chow F-Test
§   0.98   0.90   0.93   0.62   0.89 
Jarque-Bera 
2-test   0.25   0.93   0.67   0.25   0.02 
LM autocorrelation F-test   0.28   0.25   0.41   0.76   0.47 
Heteroscedasticity F-test   0.07   0.75   0.11   0.98   0.40 
restricted model descriptive statistics 
R
2   0.71   0.51   0.48   0.62   0.31 
Akaike  Criterion  -2.09 -0.48 -0.41 -2.35 -0.72 
 
                                                            
§ The null for the Chow Test is that the estimated parameters using the first half of the sample (66 
observations) are equal to the estimated parameters using the second half of the sample. 28 
 
 
Table 4. Regression Residual Correlation Coefficients 
The restricted model is estimated by SUR, with no instruments for US intervention. 
  Gov~attacks Gov~killed Detentions Rebel~attacks
Gov~killed  0.261      
Detentions  0.560 0.018   
Rebel~attacks  0.243 0.149 0.103 




Table 5. Steady-State Coefficients 












  coeff.  t ratio  coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio  coeff.  t ratio
Military~aid  0.027  1.554  0.072 2.463 0.036 1.666 0.110 3.877  0.050  1.916
OECD~aid  -0.333  -1.568  -0.894 -2.564 -0.440 -1.682 -1.357 -4.406  -0.614  -1.934
Narco~aid  -1.365  -2.688  -1.944 -3.362 -1.814 -3.366 -0.362 -1.979  -0.624  -1.874
Inflation  -0.051  -1.703  -0.218 -3.648 0.039 1.377 -0.013 -1.456  -0.036  -1.580
Coup  -0.296  -1.754  -1.058 -4.352 -0.391 -1.904 -0.079 -1.520  -0.546  -2.262
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Figure 1. The Monthly Conflict Series (Including Interpolated Annual Totals)  
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Figure 2. The Correlates of Conflict Intensity 




































Figure 3. The Transformed Monthly Conflict Series 

































Figure 4. Generalized Impulse Responses for a Unit Shock to Gov~attacks 



























Figure 5. Generalized Impulse Responses for a Unit Shock to Gov~killed 





































Figure 6. Generalized Impulse Responses for a Unit Shock to Detentions 









































Figure 7. Generalized Impulse Responses for a Unit Shock to Rebel~attacks 
































Figure 8. Generalized Impulse Responses for a Unit Shock to Rebel~killed 



























Figure 9. Responses to a Unit Increase in Military~aid 



























Figure 10. Responses to a Unit Increase in 
OECD~aid













































Figure 11. Responses to a Unit Increase in Narco~aid 

































Figure 12. Responses to a Unit Increase in Inflation 






































TESTS FOR THE STATIONARITY OF THE VARIABLES IN THE MODEL 
 
Table A1 reports Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics for the variables of interest. Part (i) of the table 
deals with the variables that are observed monthly: the conflict variables and inflation.
A1 Part (ii) of the 
table deals with the aid variables, which are observed annually. In part (i), the regression equation applied 
to each variable zt is: 
 
 zt = t + k [k ·  zt-k] +  · zt-1 + t                                (A1) 
 
where t is a seasonal intercept, t a regression residual, and k = 1,…, K. The lag order K is chosen on the 
basis of the Akaike Information Criterion. In the case of Rebel~attackst, a dummy variable for April 1986 
is also included. The table notes the sample used for estimation (which is the same as in Table 3 of the 
main text), the value of K, and the t-ratio on . With all of the conflict variables,  is less than zero, and 
the t-ratio is significant at the 5% level. The null that xt is difference-stationary can therefore be rejected 
in favour of the alternative that it is stationary in levels. With inflation  is less than zero, and the t-ratio is 
significant at the 10% level. 
  The regression equation which provides the results in part (ii) of the table is: 
 
 zt =  + k [k ·  zt-k] +  · zt-1 + t                                (A2) 
 
where  is a constant term. In this case, the sample spans a larger period than in part (i), because with 
annual data a test based on such a short sample would have very little power. With the annual data we use 
as large a sample as is available in our data sources, and the sample size varies slightly from one variable 
to another. The four variables appearing in part (ii) of the table are Military~aidt,  OECD~aidt, 
Narco~aidt, and the log of the level of counter-narcotics aid, Narco~levelt.
A2 With Military~aidt the t-
                                                            
A1 Let pt stand for the logarithm of the price index. The measure of annual inflation used in the main text 
(Inflationt) is defined as 12 pt. This is a moving average process, so a standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
would be biased in favour of the null. We therefore apply the test to  pt instead; this variable is designated 
‘monthly inflation’ in the table. The stationarity of  pt entails the stationarity of 12 pt. 
A2 That is, Narco~aidt = Narco~levelt. 42 
 
ratio on  is significant at the 10% level, and with OECD~aidt it is significant at the 1% level. With 
Narco~levelt the t-ratio on  is not statistically significant, so the null that Narco~levelt is difference-
stationary cannot be rejected. However, with Narco~aidt the t-ratio on  is significant at the 1% level. 
 
THE UNRESTRICTED REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table A2 reports the parameters of the unrestricted model, estimated by Least Squares. Table A2 includes 
all of the parameters appearing in equations (1-5) of the main text. Parameters retained in the restricted 
model in Table 2 of the main text are shown in bold; estimates of these parameters are approximately the 
same in both tables. It can be seen that application of the Krolzig-Hendry algorithm leads to the exclusion 
of a small number of parameters that are marginally significant in the unrestricted model, for example, the 
parameter on Rebel~killedt-1 in the Rebel~attacks equation. Retention of these parameters in the restricted 
model does not make any noticeable difference to the response profiles in Figures 4-12 of the main text. 
 
THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESTRICTED REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table A3 reports alternative estimates of the parameters of the restricted model, including the SUR 
estimates in Table 2 of the main text alongside Least Squares and Maximum Likelihood estimates. There 
are three sets of estimates in each case: the first use no instruments for Military~aidt and Narco~aidt, the 
second use worldwide aid values as instruments, and the third use Latin American aid values as 
instruments. There is little variation in the parameter estimates across the nine alternatives. A tenth 
column reports parameters obtained by applying the Least Squares estimator to monthly conflict data 
excluding the annual totals. (In other words, we replace xt' on page 11 of the main text with xt.) Again, 




THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXTENDING THE SAMPLE PERIOD BEYOND DECEMBER 1993 
 
It is possible to fit the Table 2 model to a larger data set, including monthly data for the mid-1990s. 
Figure A1 provides some information on the effect that this has on the estimated parameters of the model. 
The figure is based on a set of recursive parameter estimates. First of all, we fit the model to data for 
January 1983 – December 1992, then to data for January 1983 – January 1993, then to data for January 
1983 – February 1993, and so on up to a sample incorporating January 1983 – December 1995. In each 43 
 
case, starting with the January 1983 – January 1993 estimates, we compute Chow Test statistics for the 
null that the parameters in the extended sample are equal to the parameters in the original January 1983 – 
December 1992 sample. There is a separate Chow Test for each of the five equations. Figure A1 plots the 
change in the value of the test statistics as subsequent months are added to the sample. There are five 
charts in the table, one for each equation; the vertical axes measure the test statistic as a fraction of its 5% 
critical value.
A3 
  It can be seen that there is no significant change in the parameters of the Gov~attacks, Gov~killed 
and Detentions equations, that is, the part of the model relating to the behavior of government forces. 
However, if we extend the sample into 1994, the Chow Tests reject the null that the parameters of the 
Rebel~attacks and Rebel~killed equations are constant. Rebel behavior does change significantly in 1994, 
probably as a result of the repentance law. Given this instability in the parameter estimates, our discussion 
in the main text is based on estimates of the model fitted to data for January 1983 – December 1993. 
                                                            
A3 Figure A1 shows the Chow Test results using the model in Column 3 of Table A3, but this choice is not 
crucial to our results. 44 
 
 
Table A1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics 
(i) Monthly Variables 
(The regressions include a deterministic seasonal term, and for Rebel~attacks a dummy for April 
1986.) 
variable  sample  ADF t ratio  number of lags included 
Gov~attacks  Jan. 1983 – Dec.1993  -3.07  2 
Gov~killed  Jan. 1983 – Dec.1993  -4.30  2 
Detentions  Jan. 1983 – Dec.1993  -3.74  3 
Rebel~attacks  Jan. 1983 – Dec.1993  -2.91  2 
Rebel~killed  Jan. 1983 – Dec.1993  -3.24  2 
Monthly inflation  Jan. 1983 – Dec.1993  -2.73  3 
(ii) Annual Variables (The regressions include an intercept.) 
variable  sample  ADF t ratio  number of lags included 
Military~aid  1961-2008 -2.37  0 
OECD~aid  1963-2008 -4.17  0 
Narco~level  1976-2008 -1.66  1 




Table A2. Unrestricted Least Squares Regression Results 
Effects retained in the restricted model are written in bold type. 
  
    Gov~attacks 
equation  
    Gov~killed 
equation  
    Detentions 
equation  
    
Rebel~attacks 
equation   
    Rebel~killed 
equation 
   coeff.  t ratio   coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff.  t ratio   coeff. t  ratio
Gov~attackst-1    0.303  2.36   0.802 2.72 -0.033 -0.11 coeff.  t ratio  -0.002 -0.01
Gov~attackst-1   0.192  1.44  0.021 0.07 0.096 0.29 -0.064  -0.55   0.399 1.40
Gov~attackst-3    0.329  2.41   0.760 2.42  0.837 2.49 0.234  1.89   0.328 1.12
Gov~attackst-4   0.188  1.42  0.324 1.06 0.145 0.45 0.220  1.77  0.140 0.50
Gov~killedt-1   0.060  1.38  -0.133 -1.34 0.169 1.58 0.006  0.05  -0.030 -0.33
Gov~killedt-1   -0.076  -1.75  -0.166 -1.67 0.092 0.86 -0.010  -0.26  0.077 0.83
Gov~killedt-3   -0.035  -0.77  0.053 0.51 -0.081 -0.73 -0.060  -1.52  0.028 0.29
Gov~killedt-4   -0.060  -1.35   -0.305 -2.97 -0.106 -0.97 -0.029  -0.72  0.021 0.22
Detentionst-1   -0.048  -0.91  -0.179 -1.46 0.015 0.11 0.058  0.94  -0.111 -0.97
Detentionst-2   -0.078  -1.48  -0.069 -0.57 -0.160 -1.23 -0.018  -0.37  -0.165 -1.46
Detentionst-3    -0.158  -3.08   -0.405 -3.44  -0.375 -2.98 -0.042  -0.87   -0.251 -2.29
Detentionst-4   -0.064  -1.18  -0.218 -1.76 -0.056 -0.42 -0.080  -1.70  -0.200 -1.73
Rebel~attackst-1   0.042  0.30  -0.407 -1.24 -0.466 -1.33  0.367  3.05  0.241 0.79
Rebel~attackst-1   0.135  0.94  -0.361 -1.09 0.241 0.68  0.157  1.21   0.384 1.25
Rebel~attackst-3   -0.106  -0.78  -0.079 -0.25 0.056 0.17 -0.034  -0.26  0.192 0.66
Rebel~attackst-4   -0.011  -0.08   0.655 2.23 0.118 0.38  0.217  1.72  0.159 0.58
Rebel~killedt-1    0.112  1.67  0.233 1.51  0.381 2.31 -0.086  -2.11  0.001 0.01
Rebel~killedt-1   -0.006  -0.09   0.412 2.64 -0.219 -1.31 -0.006  -0.11  -0.182 -1.25
Rebel~killedt-3    0.143  2.11  0.247 1.59  0.265 1.59 0.013  0.20  0.053 0.36
Rebel~killedt-4    0.163 2.44   0.179 1.17 -0.024 -0.14 0.004  0.07  -0.013 -0.09
Military~aidt   0.001  0.02  0.029 0.36 0.124 1.45 0.039  1.19  0.061 0.82
Military~aidt-12   -0.013 -0.37  0.058 0.70 -0.149 -1.69  0.058  1.82  -0.075 -0.98
OECD~aidt   -0.398  -1.37  -0.797 -1.19 -1.096 -1.53 -0.238  -1.73  -0.366 -0.59
OECD~aidt-12  0.061 0.21  0.088 0.13 1.24 1.72  -1.146  -4.31  0.977 1.56
Narco~aidt    -0.223  -1.59   -0.338 -1.05  -0.779 -2.26 0.005  0.16  -0.471 -1.57
Narco~aidt-12   -0.390  -2.59   -0.828 -2.39  -0.881 -2.38 -0.007  -0.05  -0.502 -1.56
Inflationt   0.019  0.54   -0.099 -1.20  0.162 1.83 -0.216  -1.27  0.061 0.80
Coupt   0.059  0.32   -0.840 -1.94 0.127 0.28  -0.126 -2.58    -0.466 -1.16
April 1986             -1.361  -3.84     
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Table A3. Regression Results Using Different Estimators and Instruments for US Intervention 
  no instruments for US intervention  world instruments for US intervention  Lat. American instruments for US intervention using monthly 
  (1) LS    (2) SUR  (3) ML  (4) LS  (5) SUR  (6) ML  (7) LS  (8) SUR  (9) ML  data only 
                                                  
Gov~attacks equation coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio 
Gov~attackst-1  0.425  5.58  0.399  6.48 0.399 6.60 0.427 5.61 0.411 6.62 0.411  7.25 0.414 5.47 0.399 6.46 0.399 6.98 0.449 5.87 
Gov~attackst-3  0.331  3.41  0.335  3.68 0.336 3.89 0.339 3.48 0.354 3.87 0.355  4.21 0.321 3.35 0.337 3.71 0.337 3.86 0.277 2.85 
Detentionst-3  -0.143  -2.99  -0.129  -2.79 -0.128 -2.80 -0.152 -3.15 -0.142 -3.03 -0.142  -3.12 -0.146 -3.08 -0.135 -2.95 -0.135 -2.84 -0.114 -2.28 
Rebel~killedt-1  0.138  2.98  0.124  2.80 0.121 2.87 0.137 2.94 0.118 2.66 0.115  2.77 0.149 3.22 0.129 2.96 0.126 2.99 0.158 3.35 
Rebel~killedt-3  0.133  2.71  0.112  2.40 0.110 2.01 0.143 2.89 0.116 2.49 0.113  2.06 0.150 3.06 0.124 2.68 0.121 2.24 0.132 2.62 
Narco~aidt  -0.188  -2.17  -0.202  -2.41 -0.204 -2.42 -0.301 -2.36 -0.295 -2.30 -0.299  -2.33 -0.400 -2.80 -0.371 -2.61 -0.378 -2.65 -0.215 -2.41 
Narco~aidt-12 -0.250  -3.07  -0.246  -3.13 -0.247 -3.83 -0.172 -2.34 -0.163 -2.28 -0.163  -2.52 -0.192 -2.64 -0.176 -2.48 -0.178 -2.83 -0.258 -3.10 
          0.329            0.330           0.330           0.322           0.297           0.330           0.318           0.264           0.327           0.336 
                                                  
Gov~killed equation coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio 
Gov~attackst-1  0.418  2.31  0.462  2.63 0.464 2.91 0.474 2.59 0.519 2.92 0.523  2.98 0.483 2.63 0.522 2.92 0.526 2.96 0.455 2.47 
Gov~attackst-3  0.761  3.16  0.711  3.04 0.686 3.05 0.769 3.12 0.725 3.04 0.696  3.14 0.760 3.08 0.723 3.02 0.691 3.10 0.666 2.69 
Gov~killedt-4  -0.289  -3.34  -0.249  -3.04 -0.235 -3.00 -0.289 -3.26 -0.245 -2.95 -0.230  -2.99 -0.289 -3.24 -0.249 -2.97 -0.234 -3.11 -0.270 -3.10 
Detentionst-3  -0.398  -3.74  -0.373  -3.59 -0.367 -4.41 -0.384 -3.51 -0.363 -3.39 -0.355  -3.92 -0.373 -3.43 -0.352 -3.31 -0.343 -3.87 -0.391 -3.47 
Rebel~attackst-4  0.632  2.93  0.555  2.72 0.554 2.72 0.582 2.65 0.504 2.44 0.503  2.29 0.583 2.62 0.489 2.33 0.489 2.16 0.616 2.66 
Rebel~killedt-2  0.266  2.39  0.224  2.13 0.214 1.91 0.276 2.42 0.232 2.17 0.221  2.05 0.281 2.46 0.243 2.26 0.233 2.14 0.281 2.44 
Narco~aidt  -0.466  -2.37  -0.477  -2.48 -0.491 -2.62 -0.293 -1.01 -0.296 -1.02 -0.304  -1.05 -0.207 -0.57 -0.166 -0.45 -0.155 -0.43 -0.424 -2.06 
Narco~aidt-12 -0.712  -3.69  -0.685  -3.63 -0.684 -4.71 -0.502 -2.89 -0.468 -2.76 -0.456  -3.04 -0.514 -2.89 -0.467 -2.69 -0.453 -2.86 -0.639 -3.21 
Inflationt  -0.174  -2.94  -0.183  -3.25 -0.186 -3.85 -0.184 -3.04 -0.193 -3.35 -0.196  -3.97 -0.189 -2.96 -0.188 -3.12 -0.191 -3.79 -0.204 -3.26 
Coupt  -0.907  -4.14  -0.953  -4.59 -0.951 -5.62 -0.893 -3.92 -0.919 -4.28 -0.903  -4.78 -0.912 -3.56 -0.903 -3.74 -0.880 -4.24 -1.047 -4.59 
          0.718            0.720           0.721           0.718           0.354           0.737           0.720           0.734           0.738           0.742 
                                               
Detentions equation coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio 
Gov~attackst-3  0.742 3.77    0.734 3.76 0.739 3.65 0.752 3.90 0.762 3.99 0.767 3.96 0.693 3.50 0.706 3.59 0.711 3.37 0.790 4.02 
Detentionst-3  -0.324 -2.89    -0.298 -2.70 -0.299 -2.92 -0.352 -3.18 -0.337 -3.09 -0.338 -3.40 -0.312 -2.79 -0.299 -2.72 -0.300 -2.87 -0.353 -3.00 
Rebel~killedt-1  0.266 2.48    0.245 2.34 0.240 1.92 0.262 2.50 0.232 2.26 0.225 1.83 0.299 2.81 0.265 2.55 0.257 2.01 0.273 2.53 
Rebel~killedt-3  0.314 2.79    0.287 2.61 0.280 2.23 0.345 3.14 0.311 2.88 0.304 2.48 0.356 3.18 0.320 2.91 0.311 2.52 0.309 2.72 
Narco~aidt  -0.524 -2.64    -0.482 -2.48 -0.478 -2.49 -1.073 -3.49 -1.040 -3.40 -1.047 -3.42 -0.953 -2.91 -0.925 -2.84 -0.944 -2.89 -0.521 -2.56 
Narco~aidt-12  -0.560 -3.03    -0.538 -2.98 -0.542 -2.74 -0.333 -2.02 -0.334 -2.08 -0.343 -2.18 -0.380 -2.27 -0.381 -2.33 -0.394 -2.37 -0.586 -3.11 
Inflationt  0.125 2.32    0.107 2.43 0.110 3.16 0.106 2.02 0.099 2.29 0.102 3.17 0.093 1.74 0.093 2.10 0.096 3.02 0.129 2.34 
           0.762            0.763           0.763           0.731           0.475           0.748           0.743           0.603           0.761           0.775 
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Table A3 (Continued) 
  no instruments for US intervention  world instruments for US intervention  Lat. American instruments for US intervention using monthly 
  LS    SUR ML  LS SUR ML  LS SUR ML  data only 
Rebel~attacks equation coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio 
Gov~attackst-4  0.136  2.27  0.152  3.00 0.154 3.54 0.103 1.66 0.129 2.41 0.135  3.04 0.113 1.84 0.135 2.56 0.139 3.14 0.112 2.00 
Rebel~attackst-1  0.257  3.18  0.194  2.90 0.187 2.66 0.350 4.43 0.279 4.14 0.259  3.32 0.321 4.02 0.255 3.80 0.242 3.08 0.278 3.46 
Rebel~attackst-3  0.241  3.12  0.233  3.58 0.225 2.84 0.281 3.50 0.263 3.83 0.247  3.04 0.249 3.10 0.238 3.47 0.228 2.88 0.248 3.12 
Military~aidt  0.061  3.54  0.059  3.90 0.056 3.79 0.031 1.63 0.027 1.51 0.020  1.11 0.053 2.66 0.045 2.31 0.038 1.98 0.060 3.48 
OECD~aidt  -0.754  -4.03  -0.726  -4.60 -0.716 -4.73 -0.468 -2.69 -0.439 -3.00 -0.435  -3.02 -0.475 -2.77 -0.449 -3.12 -0.448 -3.31 -0.754 -3.95 
April 1986  -1.577  -4.99  -1.052  -4.02 -0.923 -8.07 -1.522 -4.60 -0.992 -3.56 -0.827  -6.68 -1.579 -4.81 -1.046 -3.80 -0.889 -6.75 -1.561 -4.89 
          0.292            0.297           0.300           0.299           0.112           0.316           0.295           0.370           0.312           0.294 
           
Rebel~killed equation coeff.  t ratio  coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff.  t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio 
Gov~attackst-2  0.316 1.81    0.163 1.12 0.125 1.02 0.316 1.81 0.162 1.10 0.112 0.91 0.316 1.81 0.156 1.06 0.112 0.88 0.328 1.88 
Gov~attackst-3  0.411 2.02    0.353 2.02 0.335 2.97 0.411 2.02 0.368 2.08 0.343 2.88 0.411 2.02 0.368 2.09 0.348 2.96 0.419 2.07 
Detentionst-3  -0.188 -2.03    -0.117 -1.48 -0.102 -1.57 -0.188 -2.03 -0.128 -1.61 -0.108 -1.73 -0.188 -2.03 -0.130 -1.63 -0.112 -1.79 -0.202 -2.10 
Rebel~attackst-2  0.328 1.82    0.364 2.37 0.371 2.52 0.328 1.82 0.355 2.29 0.361 2.39 0.328 1.82 0.362 2.34 0.364 2.37 0.316 1.70 
Coupt  -0.520 -2.87    -0.411 -2.51 -0.365 -2.12 -0.520 -2.87 -0.256 -1.60 -0.156 -1.02 -0.520 -2.87 -0.290 -1.78 -0.212 -1.23 -0.531 -2.90 
           0.662            0.667           0.670           0.647           0.704           0.678           0.647           0.692           0.675           0.668 
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Figure A1. Recursive Chow Test Statistics as a Fraction of the 5% Critical 
Value
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